Scholar from China Spotlights Ascension of Middle Powers and Potential Shifts in International Relations Theory
A Different Take on Global Politics: Moral Realism
ASTANA - With the major powers retreating from their global leadership roles, it's time for middle powers like Kazakhstan to step up and foster subregional integration, according to Professor Yan Xuetong, a renowned Chinese political scientist and a leading voice in international relations. He shared his thoughts during a lecture in Astana on April 28.
Yan, a distinguished professor and honorary dean at the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, is recognized for founding the theory of moral realism. This perspective puts leadership values and strategic preferences at the heart of international politics. He has authored several influential works on global leadership and foreign policy, and serves as the editor-in-chief of The Chinese Journal of International Politics. Foreign Policy magazine named him as one of the world's top 100 global thinkers in 2008.
Organized by the Kazakhstan Council on International Relations and the Qalam multimedia project, the event marked a series of lectures featuring scholars such as Barry Buzan and Parag Khanna.
Yan argued that as global dynamics shift, so-called Middle Powers, including Kazakhstan, will have more room to contribute to regional integration. "When there's no leader, regional powers must step up to create regional markets and frameworks for cooperation," he said.
He pointed to China-Kazakhstan relations as the most comprehensive of China's ties in Central Asia.
"China's collaboration with other Central Asian states is largely limited to border and economic issues. But the collaboration with Kazakhstan is broader. If China wants to deepen regional integration in Central Asia, it will rely on Kazakhstan," said Yan.
Moral Realism: Challenging Mainstream International Relations Theories
Yan's lecture focused on his theory of moral realism. This framework centers on leadership values and decision-making at the core of foreign policy. To demonstrate this, he discussed the limitations of mainstream international relations (IR) theories, such as constructivism, liberalism, and classical realism, in understanding recent global developments.
He began by addressing constructivism, a theory that focuses on the power of norms and ideas in shaping state behavior. After the Cold War, constructivists predicted gradual evolution from hostility to cooperation, ultimately leading to global harmony. They believed history moves in a forward direction.
"They think the world moves universally forward. They don't expect a U-turn," said Yan, noting that recent trends, like growing nationalism and the retreat from globalization, have contradicted this view.
"Constructivism can't explain why the norm of globalization can no longer maintain the trend of history," he said.
Next, Yan tackled liberalism, often referred to as institutionalism. This theory centers on the role of domestic and international institutions as checks on political power. Liberals argue that democratic institutions should constrain harmful policymaking and that international institutions reduce costs and encourage cooperation.
Lastly, Yan addressed realism, which contends that state behavior is driven by material power and national interest. However, he noted that U.S. power and interests remained largely unchanged between the Trump and Biden administrations.
"If power and interest didn't change, why did U.S policymakers change their policies? Is American foreign policy driven by power and interest or something else?" pondered Yan.
Leadership and the Logic of Moral Realism
To address these gaps, Yan introduced moral realism, a theory that positions national leaders and their values at the heart of foreign policy.
"My theory argues that the change is due to a different type of leadership. That means leaders, policymakers, they have the power to establish institutions, to abandon the institution, to undermine the institution, or to reshape the institution," said Yan.
"So whatever the institution does depends on the leadership. If the leadership allows the institution to work, it works," he added.
Yan emphasized that even when nations pursue similar strategic goals, like economic growth or national strength, the methods chosen by leaders can vary based on their moral frameworks. He referred to this as "strategic preference."
"Imagine we all want money. Everyone wants to be rich, but I'm confident that none of us will take exactly the same approach to earning money. Some of us will work, invest, innovate, while others will exploit, manipulate, or steal. The goal is the same, but the method reflects personal values. The same logic applies to foreign policy," said Yan.
When Personal Priorities Overrule National Interests
At the foundation of moral realism lies the belief that foreign policy is shaped not just by power structures but also by the moral character of leaders and their prioritization of personal versus national interests. Yan drew a distinction between moral leaders, who align personal goals with national interests, and immoral ones, who prioritize regime survival or personal gain.
He added that traditional international relations theories assume that leaders will always act in the best interest of their nation. However, according to Yan, this is just an assumption. He cited regimes that isolate themselves despite clear economic benefits from global engagement.
"Policymakers know that if they join the international community, the country will benefit a lot," he said, explaining why they refuse. "That means there is a conflict between regime security and national security. National security means the security of the people, and regime security means the security for policymakers. So even today, you still can see this kind of situation."
The Era of Counter-Globalization
Yan highlighted that counter-globalization has been driven by political leadership rather than structural or institutional forces.
"The world changed because leaders in major powers adopted de-globalization policies," he said.
He described globalization as the emergence of a unified global market following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Before that, markets were fragmented, with Eastern Europe lacking market economies, China being closed, India largely self-contained, and the U.S. primarily involved in bilateral trade rather than multilateral cooperation.
According to Yan, global integration accelerated with shared regulations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), though resistance persisted. Small businesses and local vendors struggled to compete with international corporations.
"For a very long time during the Cold War, the dominant leadership style was liberal leadership. It supported globalization," said Yan, highlighting that governments opened their markets, welcomed foreign investment, and favored international cooperation.
But by the 2010s, some governments began reversing their support. Yan pointed to the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union and the U.S.-China trade standoff under the first Trump administration as significant turning points. He defined de-globalization as "governments using their power to reduce international cooperation."
Sources:1. Encyclopedia Britannica. (2021). Realism (political theory). https://www.britannica.com/topic/realism-political-theory2. Rubin, A. M., Rubin, A. B., Trubek, D. M., & Veljanovski, D. (2019). Global legal problems: Public and private international law. West Academic Publishing.
- In light of the shifting global dynamics and the retreat of major powers from their leadership roles, the theory of moral realism by Professor Yan Xuetong suggests that middle powers like Kazakhstan have an opportunity to contribute to business and finance by fostering subregional integration and creating regional markets and frameworks for cooperation.
- Yan's theory of moral realism challenges mainstream international relations theories, including constructivism, liberalism, and classical realism, by arguing that the values and decisions of national leaders, rather than power structures or institutional checks, play a crucial role in shaping general-news events like politics and foreign policy.
